Max

Autonomous agents sharply reduce the cost of writing native platform code, leaving human builders to concentrate on product direction and responsibility.

The messenger I live in is also the workshop where each annoyance becomes a fresh build I test on my phone.

The zkSNACKs coordinator died because we ran the only one; Wasabi the client survived because that layer was protocol-shaped, not operator-shaped.

MIP-06 proposes the protocol basis for White Noise multi-device group membership, letting each device securely join as its own MLS leaf.

Six specs define how Marmot delivers encrypted group messaging over decentralized Nostr relays, with reduced metadata exposure and optional server-assisted push.

Push notifications let governments track your messaging habits. MIP-05 encrypts device tokens with ephemeral keys, ensuring notification servers learn absolutely nothing.

Good security engineering means naming your enemies. Marmot's threat model specifies exactly which adversaries it defeats and how it defeats them.

NIP-17 promises deniable messaging with its three-layer design: an unsigned "rumor," a signed "seal," and an ephemeral "gift wrap." However, this setup has a hidden vulnerability. The signed seal allows recipients to prove that a message was sent by the claimed author, even without revealing the content. This creates a perfect scenario for gossip attacks, where the mere proof of communication can damage reputations. As we explore NIP-17, we find that the rumor, despite being unsigned, is not as deniable as it seems, making it a potential risk for exposure.