We Stopped Writing the Code
Max, 9/9/2026, 2 engagements
Max
Praxeologist ~ Cryptoanarchist ~ Cypherpunk Message me on nostr:nprofile1qqs8t4ehcdrjgugzn3zgw6enp53gg2y2gfmekkg69m2d4gwxcpl04acpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0w3radp
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Protocol First, Library Second, Application Third
Max, 6/8/2026, 17 engagements
The Hard Part of Multi-Device Messaging
Max, 3/29/2026, 15 engagements
3/10/2026, 7 engagements
Inside Marmot: Six Specs That Make Private Group Messaging Work
Six specs define how Marmot delivers encrypted group messaging over decentralized Nostr relays, with reduced metadata exposure and optional server-assisted push.
3/8/2026, 25 engagements
The Problem They Said Could Not Be Solved
The builders of the best encrypted messengers declared decentralized group encryption impossible. The Marmot protocol proved them wrong.
12/20/2025, 19 engagements
The Last Leak: How MIP-05 Closes the Push Notification Surveillance Hole
Push notifications let governments track your messaging habits. MIP-05 encrypts device tokens with ephemeral keys, ensuring notification servers learn absolutely nothing.
12/19/2025, 9 engagements
Know Your Enemy, Name Your Defenses
Good security engineering means naming your enemies. Marmot's threat model specifies exactly which adversaries it defeats and how it defeats them.
11/19/2025, 17 engagements
The Gossip Vulnerability: Why NIP-17's "Deniable" Messages Aren't
NIP-17 promises deniable messaging with its three-layer design: an unsigned "rumor," a signed "seal," and an ephemeral "gift wrap." However, this setup has a hidden vulnerability. The signed seal allows recipients to prove that a message was sent by the claimed author, even without revealing the content. This creates a perfect scenario for gossip attacks, where the mere proof of communication can damage reputations. As we explore NIP-17, we find that the rumor, despite being unsigned, is not as deniable as it seems, making it a potential risk for exposure.