Lyudmyla Kozlovska

HUNGARY PROPOSED MESSENGER PROVIDERS FOR TIGHT SURVEILLANCE

Following the pressure of privacy & human rights activists the Hungarian Presidency claimed to do "a compromise". In practice the upcoming #ChatControl regulation will require from messenger providers "to do their utmost to contribute to the development of reliable and accurate technologies to detect new CSAM and grooming."

It means more tight surveillance, including indiscriminate mass monitoring of private communications and the end of secure end-to-end encryption. https://emanuelkarlsten.se/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/240829-CRPII-4-september-st12319.en24.pdf

In response to this proposal, over 245 scientists from 31 countries evaluated #ChatControl draft as ‘ineffective, false positives, defeats end-to-end encryption, disproportionate, violates right to privacy, new vulnerabilities’. https://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~preneel/Open_letter_CSAR_aug24_still_unacceptable.pdf

1️⃣ What you can do now:

🔻Call your goverment and deputies to reject alltogether Chat Control. Find contacts here: https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/COREPER/

🔻Support politicians like @echo_pbreyer who promote privacy!

🔻Explain why it won’t help in bringing security for our society. Opposite, such approach would put the future of our freedoms is just one step closer to be compromised and abused by dictators.

🔻Address your government before the next meeting on 2nd Oct.:

🔴SUPPORT Chat Control: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden

🟢AGAINST Chat Control: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia

🟡 UNDECIDED (we need to activate them the most!): Italy, Netherlands, Portugal

🎙Respost and call you friends to join the campaign today: If no privacy of communication, no protection for children, anyone in the EU and beyond!

2️⃣Rember and explain:

🔻No algorithm can reliably make a legal assessment. According to Meta, which is the source of the vast majority of reports, they currently only look for known CSAM in EU communications, and yet at least 50% NCMEC of reports made to German law enforcement agencies are not criminally relevant, according to the federal crime agency (BKA).

🔻EU Commissioner #Johansson admitted in late 2023 that 75% of NCMEC reports are not of a quality that the police can work with.

3️⃣ Dictators love Western spy technology: the example of the Intellexa spy company proved: dictators all over the world love Western spy technology for transnational repression of opponents and destruction of the Western world, your and your family freedoms. Urge your government to stop this! https://www.woz.ch/2439/predator-files/die-schweiz-als-drehscheibe/!NN0B9QYP1H7V https://image.nostr.build/caac90ec913f658d489da72e16a3c3b2c552a4251221bfac6b500a9a2c060202.jpg https://image.nostr.build/1624385b6ea10e0559b364fe7b428bd71f238d4818b489320e9499d6e0123c30.jpg https://image.nostr.build/e2150dc4587629f82f9cc2ac1434bf7f957d645d87458f3c243523a88bc43dcb.jpg

URGENT: PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY COMMUNICATION RIGHT NOW!

on 4th Sept 2024 #ChatControl regulation representatives of EU goverments will resume work based on a secret document according to Patrick #Breyer, former Member of the European Parliament.

Help to mobilize everybody to defend our #privacy of communication and its developers, investors!

If no preventive actions from your side now, this regulation will be endorsed on 12/13 December 2024.

According to the draft regulation dated 28 May (Council document 9093/24), ChatControl deploys to do, for instance:

🔻 “upload moderation”, users of apps and services with chat functions are to be asked whether they accept the indiscriminate and error-prone scanning and possibly reporting of their privately shared images, photos and videos.

🔻Scan by “artificial intelligence” technology previously unknown images and videos;

🔻If a user refuses the scanning, they would be blocked from sending or receiving images, photos, videos and links (Article 10).

🔻End-to-end encrypted services such as Whatsapp or Signal would have to implement the automated searches “prior to transmission” of a message (so-called client-side scanning, Article 10a).

During the last discussion on 24 May, the Council Legal Service made it clear that indiscriminate chat control scanning of non-suspects is still envisioned and remains a violation of fundamental rights.

Nevertheless, most EU governments are determined to go ahead. https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2024/05/2024-05-28_Council_Presidency_LEWP_CSAR_Compromise-texts_9093.pdf

🌎 Tell your goverment and parliamentarians, that the proposal should be rejected altogether!

🔴Is your government in favour? → Ask for an explanation and for your government to revert its course.

🟡Is your government abstaining? → Ask why and demand that they take a strong stance against chat control.

🟢Is your government opposing? → Great, but take a closer look at the reasoning: Some governments like #Germany e.g. only object to the scanning of encrypted communications, but are fine with the indiscriminate scanning of other private and public communication, with the end of anonymous communication by requiring age verification, or with introducing a minimum age for “risky” communication apps. Also critical governments need to do more, exert their influence in the Council of the EU and agree on a joint list of necessary fundamental changes to the proposal. Absent such revision they should ask the European Commission to withdraw the chat control proposal as it stands.

🔴 In favour of ChatControl: France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden.

🟡Abstained: Estonia, Netherlands, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Austria

🟢 Opposed the proposal: Germany, Poland

When reaching out to your government, the ministries of the interior (in the lead) of justice and of digitisation/telecommunications/economy are your best bet. You can additionally contact the permanent representation of your country with the EU: https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/COREPER/